An oral panel is testing whether you can run a deck department under real time pressure, not just recite regulations. This chapter works through the handover, the judgement calls, and the scenarios examiners return to most often, with the reasoning spelled out and not just the answer.
Every scenario question in the chief mate oral is really the same question wearing different clothes: something has gone wrong, or might be about to, and the examiner wants to know what you do and in what order. Candidates lose marks not because they don't know the technical answer, but because they give it out of sequence — quoting a stability figure before anyone has been told to stand clear, or fixing a leak before checking whether it has hurt anyone. The panel is assessing whether you would actually run a department, and a department runs on sequence: the wrong action taken first can undo the right action taken second.
A structure that holds for almost every scenario, from a list alongside to a fire in the paint store, is: make the immediate situation safe, inform the master, account for everyone in the vicinity, contain the problem so it doesn't get worse, act to resolve it, then report and record what happened and what was done. Say it in that order even when your instinct is to jump straight to the technical fix — the technical fix is usually step four or five, not step one.
The examiner is grading the shape of your answer as much as its content. A technically correct answer given in the wrong order reads as someone who would act correctly by luck rather than by habit.
This does not mean reciting six words like a mantra with no content behind them. Each step has to be filled with what you would actually do on your own ship, with your own crew, in the scenario given — "inform the master" is not a complete answer if you cannot say how (VHF, phone, in person) and what you would tell them in the first thirty seconds.
A join-ship scenario is really asking one question: what would you check before you would put your name against this department? The examiner is not looking for a memorised list recited at speed — they are looking for someone who understands that a handover is a risk assessment of everything the outgoing mate leaves behind, some of it written down and some of it only visible if you go and look.
Work through it in layers rather than alphabetically. Start with the cargo: what's aboard, in what condition, against what plan, and what stability and strength condition the ship is in as a result — draught, GM, any restrictions from the loading computer, any bending moment or shear approaching a limit. Then the department's material state: outstanding defects, especially anything affecting the LSA, FFA, or steering; certificates and surveys due within the voyage; the condition of mooring lines, wires, and anchoring gear, since these get relied on without warning. Finally the people and the paperwork: the competence and certification of the watchkeepers and crew you're inheriting, and any permits left open — hot work, enclosed space, or otherwise — that must be closed or formally handed over rather than forgotten.
Delivering that list calmly, in a logical order, without notes, is itself part of the answer — it shows the examiner that you have done it before or have genuinely thought it through, rather than that you are guessing what they want to hear. If you don't know an item — a survey date, a defect's status — say you would check the file or ask the outgoing mate directly, rather than inventing a plausible-sounding answer.
Scenario questions about cargo and stability are designed to catch a mate who has learned the actions but not the reasoning behind them. "I would stop cargo" is a true sentence in almost every cargo-emergency scenario, but on its own it earns half the marks available, because it doesn't show the examiner that you understand what you are protecting against or how you would know when it is safe to resume.
The stronger version names the hazard and the uncertainty: "I would stop cargo because the list is increasing and I don't yet know whether that's an uneven load between holds, an unplanned ballast movement, or water getting in somewhere it shouldn't" tells the examiner you understand the range of causes, that you would investigate rather than guess, and that resuming cargo before the cause is known and controlled would be the wrong call even if it costs time alongside.
The same logic applies to heavy weather decisions. Reducing speed or altering course is the visible action, but the reasoning behind it — pitching that is starting to slam forward sections, a beam sea building an uncomfortable roll close to the ship's own natural period, lashings rated for a lesser sea state — is what shows the examiner you would make the call before damage occurs rather than after. Securing loose gear, rechecking lashings, and informing the master of the decision and the reason for it all belong in the same breath as the course or speed change itself.
Every "what" needs a "because." State the hazard you are managing and the uncertainty you are resolving, not only the action you are taking.
This is also where candidates are tempted to abandon a correct answer under gentle pushback from the panel. If your reasoning was sound when you gave it, a follow-up question that challenges you is testing whether you'll hold your position, not signalling that you were wrong — reconsider only if new information genuinely changes the picture.
No scenario in the syllabus deserves more scrutiny than enclosed space entry, because it is the one task that kills experienced crew on ordinary ships doing ordinary jobs, usually because a step that looked unnecessary on a calm day was skipped. The examiner is checking not whether you know the acronym, but whether you would actually stop a routine job to do it properly when everyone around you wants to get on.
The sequence is identify the space, isolate it from any source of gas or liquid ingress, ventilate it, test the atmosphere, raise a permit, and have both a dedicated attendant and rescue arrangements in place before anyone crosses the coaming. Testing means more than one reading taken from the most convenient point — gases and vapours behave differently by density and by where they are generated, so the atmosphere has to be checked at the top, middle, and bottom of the space, and monitoring should continue while people are inside, not stop once entry is authorised.
Rescue arrangements are where marks are lost hardest, because they are the step that feels least urgent when the space has just tested clear. A retrieval line and harness rigged at the entrance, a means of communication between attendant and entrants, and enough trained people topside to run an extraction without anyone else having to go in and become a second casualty — all of this has to exist before entry, not be assembled after someone collapses.
Time pressure is usually built into the scenario deliberately: a deadline to sail, a tide, a following job. The correct oral answer treats the deadline as irrelevant to whether the space is safe, and says so plainly rather than looking for a shortcut that still sounds responsible.
The remaining scenarios in this topic — an injured crew member, a PSC inspection turning up deficiencies, a piece of equipment someone wants to use — are all variations on the same underlying question the examiner keeps returning to: how do you satisfy yourself that something is actually safe, rather than assuming it because it usually is.
For an injury, the sequence starts the same way every time: make the scene safe before approaching, run a primary survey — airway, breathing, circulation, and so on — get medical advice by radio if the injury is beyond first aid, and preserve the scene and the evidence around it rather than tidying up, because how the injury happened matters as much as treating it. Reporting and recording follow, but they follow treatment and safety, not precede it.
For a PSC deficiency, the examiner wants a process rather than a defensive reaction: understand exactly what was found and why it was written up, agree a corrective action with the port state control officer or your company, carry it out and keep evidence that you did, and get it formally closed and recorded before treating the matter as finished. Arguing with a PSC finding in the scenario, rather than working the process, is a common way to lose marks.
Underneath both of these sits the same test for "is it fit for use" — a piece of lifting gear, an item of LSA, an appliance after a repair. The honest answer is that something is fit for use when it has been tested, certificated, and inspected by someone competent to do so, and that inspection is recorded — and if you can't say who did that and when, you cannot honestly say it is fit for use, however normal it looks.
"Fit for use" is a checkable fact, not an impression. Know what test, certificate, or inspection you are relying on, and be ready to say so.
The two scenarios below are worked the way an examiner expects them stated — the reasoning first, the decision stated plainly at the end, exactly as you would have to say it in the room.
You have just relieved the outgoing chief mate on a bulk carrier alongside, and cargo operations (iron ore, holds No. 2 and No. 4) are already under way from two shore loaders. Forty-five minutes into loading, the duty officer reports the ship has developed a list of 3° to port, having been upright when loading began. Loader belt figures show both holds have received the same tonnage. No ballast has been worked since before cargo began, and all ballast tanks are logged as pressed up and closed. How do you handle this?
Bulk carrier alongside, loading iron ore in holds No. 2 and No. 4 List has developed from 0° to 3° to port over 45 minutes Loader belt totals show 300 t into No. 2 and 300 t into No. 4 — no difference logged All ballast tanks logged pressed up and closed since before loading began No ballast operations carried out during this loading
How do you handle this?
Rule out the obvious cause first.
| Hold | Tonnage logged |
|---|---|
| No. 2 | 300 t |
| No. 4 | 300 t |
| Difference | 0 t |
An uneven split between the two loading points would show up directly on the loader belt totals, so check those before looking anywhere else.
A zero difference in cargo doesn't clear the ballast side automatically.
| Tank | Logged status |
|---|---|
| No. 3 DB (P) | Pressed up, valve shut |
| No. 3 DB (S) | Pressed up, valve shut |
| Movement logged | None |
The tanks are logged as closed, but a log entry only records what was ordered, not what actually happened at the valve — a slack non-return valve, a valve not fully seated, or a small leak past a gland can move water without any operation being logged.
With cargo symmetric and no ballast movement logged, the list has no explained cause.
And that absence of an explanation is itself the finding that matters. An unexplained list that has grown steadily over three-quarters of an hour is treated as a possible ingress of water until proven otherwise, not as a curiosity to watch.
Apply the structure.
Stop cargo immediately, inform the master with what is known and not yet known, confirm no one is in the affected holds or void spaces, then sound every tank — not only the ones on the loading plan — including the ones logged as closed, plus bilges and void spaces, before deciding whether it is safe to resume.
AnswerStop cargo, inform the master that the cause of the list is not yet established, and sound all tanks and bilges — including tanks logged as closed — before considering resumption.
The trap: treating a tank logged as "closed" as proof that nothing moved there, and continuing to load while looking only at the cargo figures.
You are chief mate on a bulk carrier alongside, two hours from a scheduled 2200 departure. The vessel has just finished discharging coal, and the hold has been closed up for 36 hours since the last of the cargo came out. The bosun wants to send two ABs down to sweep loose residue off the tank top before departure and has taken one gas reading from the top of the access ladder, showing O₂ 20.9% and 0% combustible gas. He asks you to authorise entry now so the job is done before the hatches are secured for sea. No permit has been raised and no rescue equipment has been rigged at the space. What do you do?
Cargo hold discharged of coal, closed up for 36 hours One gas reading taken at the top of the access ladder: O₂ 20.9%, combustible gas 0% Two ABs ready to enter and sweep the tank top Departure scheduled in 2 hours No enclosed space entry permit raised; no rescue equipment rigged at the space
What do you do?
Consider what coal residue does to the atmosphere in a closed space.
Coal continues to oxidise after discharge, consuming oxygen and generating carbon monoxide, and any residual moisture or fines can add flammable gas — none of which is evenly distributed through the space.
One reading from the top of the ladder tests the best-ventilated point in the space.
Not the worst. Gases generated by the residue are most likely to be found near the tank top and in any low pockets, which a reading taken at the entrance does not represent.
The departure deadline is not evidence about the atmosphere.
It is pressure to accept less testing than the job needs. Two hours is enough time to test properly and rig rescue arrangements if the work starts now instead of being argued over.
Apply the enclosed space sequence properly before agreeing to anything.
The space must be tested at all levels with a calibrated meter, a permit raised with a defined time limit, an attendant posted at the entrance with communications to the entrants, and rescue equipment — harness, retrieval line, and resuscitation equipment — rigged and ready, before anyone crosses the coaming.
AnswerDo not authorise entry on the single reading. Require testing at top, middle and bottom of the space, a signed time-limited permit, an attendant with communications, and rescue equipment rigged at the entrance before anyone enters — even if that delays completing the sweep or, if necessary, delays departure.
The trap: accepting a single favourable reading taken at the safest point in the space, under a sailing deadline, as if it clears the whole space for entry.
Order of prioritySafe, inform, muster, contain, act, report — say it in this orderHandover checklistCargo, stability/strength, defects, LSA/FFA, certs/surveys due, moorings/anchors, crew competence, open permitsEnclosed space limitsO₂ 20.9 %, flammables < 1 % LEL, H₂S < 5 ppm, CO < 30 ppm — test top, middle and bottomEnclosed space permitIdentify, isolate, ventilate, test at all levels, time-limited permit, attendant, comms, rescue kit riggedList alongsideStop cargo, sound every tank (not only the ones being worked), check bilges/voids, inform master before resumingHeavy weather prepReduce speed/alter course to an easier heading, secure loose gear, check lashings and hatch security, inform master, log the decisionInjured crew memberMake scene safe, primary survey (ABCDE), radio medical advice, preserve the scene, log and reportPSC deficiency handlingUnderstand the finding, agree the corrective action, evidence it's done, get it closed out and recordedFitness-for-use testTested, certificated, inspected, recorded — and know by whom and whenNever invent a figureIf unsure of an exact number, say you would verify it against the certificate, manual or company procedure, and where