At management level the ship handling that matters most is the kind you hope never to need — dead in the water in a fairway, a resonant roll building astern of you, or a berth to make with no tug in sight. This chapter works through the reasoning and the numbers behind each call, not just the rule of thumb.
When the engine is gone and the ship is still making way toward danger, the anchor is not there to hold the ship — it is there to slow it down, using much the same physics that stops a runaway lorry on a gravel escape ramp. The cable, veered and dragged along the seabed under load, converts the ship's kinetic energy into friction, and usually into damage. That is the trade the anchor is making: gear for ground.
Walking back the anchor under power — lowering it on the windlass brake rather than letting it run free — keeps it under control until it is at or near the bottom, at which point it is let go and cable is veered in a short, deliberate scope. Full scope dropped at speed does not slow the ship gently: the cable comes up hard and takes the whole snub load in an instant, and something gives — usually the cable, sometimes the windlass brake or the bitts. A short scope lets the cable drag and grip progressively, converting way into friction over distance rather than into one violent jerk.
The anchor is a brake, not an emergency stop. It sheers the bow, kills way progressively, and buys time and sea room — it is not expected to bring a ship under way to a dead stop the way a mooring line would. Expecting more from it than that is the error, not the decision to use it.
This is also why the decision sits with the master alone: it weighs the near-certain loss of expensive gear against the ship, and no checklist can make that trade for the person on the bridge. What can be worked out in advance, or in the minute available, is whether there is enough cable to do useful work before it runs out — which is exactly the question the first worked example below answers.
A dead engine in open water is an inconvenience. The same failure in a buoyed channel, with traffic astern and a bend ahead, is an emergency that has to be run as a sequence, not solved as a single problem. The bridge team's job and the engine room's job separate cleanly at the moment of failure, and both start immediately rather than one after the other.
Diagnosis and manoeuvring are separate jobs, done in parallel, not in sequence. The engineers work out what has failed and whether it can be restored; the bridge team's task is to buy sea room and keep the ship in the safest available water while that work goes on. Waiting on the bridge for an engine report before acting on position and traffic wastes the only resource — time — that cannot be recovered afterward.
The habit worth building is to treat "inform, steer, prepare, call, warn" as a single drill that starts the instant the alarm sounds, rather than as five separate decisions each waiting for the last one to finish.
A ship's waterplane area is not constant as a wave passes along her length: bow and stern flare or tumble home, so the waterplane — and with it the instantaneous righting arm — narrows as a wave crest sits amidships and widens again as a trough takes its place. In ordinary conditions this barely matters. When the wave length is close to the ship's own length, and the timing of that narrowing-and-widening cycle lines up with the ship's own roll, each cycle adds a small push in the same direction as the last, and the roll grows — this is parametric rolling, a resonance, not a failure of steering.
Synchronous rolling is the more familiar cousin of the same idea: here it is the direct wave-induced heeling moment, not the changing waterplane, that repeats in time with the ship's own roll — the danger condition being an encounter period close to the full roll period, rather than half of it. Both are cured the same way: the coincidence is broken by changing speed, heading, or both, so that the encounter period moves away from the danger band. Increasing rudder activity or fighting the roll with helm alone does not address the cause, because the cause is timing, not steering.
Both phenomena are about the encounter period — how often the ship meets a wave crest — not wave height on its own. A ship can be at real risk in a moderate, well-organised swell if the timing lines up, and safe in a much rougher, more confused sea where it does not.
Recognising the pattern early matters more than the arithmetic: an unexplained, growing roll in a head or following sea, with a swell period that looks close to the time it takes the ship to travel her own length, is the signature to act on — well before the roll angle itself becomes alarming.
Following and quartering seas feel, at first, like an easier ride than meeting the weather head-on — the motion is gentler and the apparent wind drops. The danger they carry is different, not smaller. As the encounter frequency falls toward zero — the ship running nearly at the same speed as the waves — she can be picked up and accelerated down the face of a wave, a condition called surf-riding. While surf-riding, the rudder loses much of its bite as the stern lifts clear of solid water and the bow buries, and a ship that starts to yaw off her heading can swing broadside to the sea before the helm can check her — a broach.
Once broached, a ship beam-on in a heavy following sea is exposed to a large, sudden heeling moment from the next crest, at the worst possible angle. The practical defences are set before it gets that far: keep enough speed to retain rudder authority without matching the wave speed closely enough to surf-ride, and choose a heading that avoids running dead before the sea for any length of time when the swell is large and well organised. A moderate alteration of course, taken early, is far cheaper than a large one taken once the stern has already begun to slew.
The two heavy-weather following-sea risks — surf-riding/broaching and parametric rolling — share a root cause (a wave length close to the ship's length) but opposite cures in the moment: broaching risk usually argues for keeping way on for steering; parametric rolling often argues for coming off it. Diagnose which condition is actually developing before reacting.
Whether a ship can be safely berthed without tugs is a planning question, answered before the approach starts, not a test of nerve worked out alongside the jetty. The factors are the same every time: wind and current on the beam, the sequence in which mooring lines can realistically be got ashore and made fast, where the pivot point sits for the manoeuvre being flown, and what thrust is actually available to hold the ship off or bring her alongside once way is off her.
The pivot point matters because it sets the lever arm for everything else: a bow thruster works a long lever arm against the pivot when going ahead and a short one going astern, and the reverse is true of a stern thruster. Wind and current forces, meanwhile, act through the centre of the ship's lateral resistance, not through the pivot — so judging whether the available thrust can hold the ship off is a matter of comparing moments (force × lever arm) about that centre, not comparing raw forces.
A thruster with a higher rated force than the wind is not automatically enough — if the wind acts over a longer lever arm than the thruster does, the wind wins the argument that actually decides whether the ship goes where she is meant to. The worked example below sets out exactly this comparison.
When the numbers do not work — thrust and moments too small for the conditions, or the mooring sequence too exposed for the crew available — the honest, professional answer is often to wait for slack water, a wind shift, or a tug, rather than to press an approach the ship is not equipped for on the day.
The recovery manoeuvre itself — Williamson turn, single turn, or Scharnow — is watch- officer knowledge, drilled and largely mechanical once chosen. What sits at management level is everything around it: confirming a reliable datum position and time, starting GMDSS distress alerting and coordinating with other traffic and any SAR authority ashore, allocating the bridge team between conning the ship, keeping visual contact, and running the communications, and — hardest of all — deciding when a search that is not succeeding should be stood down.
The theme running through every scenario in this chapter — anchoring, propulsion loss, heavy weather, berthing — recurs here: command's real work is sequencing and judgement under pressure, not personally performing every task, and accepting that the right decision, including the decision to stop or to wait, is sometimes the unwelcome one.
Three scenarios, worked through in full: how much cable an emergency anchoring actually needs to check a ship's way, how to test a following or head sea for parametric-rolling resonance and find a speed clear of it, and how to judge — by comparing moments rather than forces — whether a berthing without tugs is realistic in the wind of the day.
A 40,000 t (light ship) product tanker suffers total loss of propulsion in a buoyed channel with 30 m of water under the keel. The master lets go the port anchor and starts walking it back under power once it is holding, aiming to check the ship's way before the next bend. At the moment full holding power comes onto the cable the ship is still making 2 m/s (≈3.9 kn) over the ground. The vessel carries 12 shackles (330 m) of cable on that anchor. Estimate whether the cable can absorb the ship's remaining way, and what that means for the master's next decision.
Displacement (light ship) = 40,000 t Working assumption for this calculation: effective mass under way (allowing for entrained water) ≈ 1.2 × displacement Speed when the cable takes the load, v = 2 m/s Estimated seabed drag/friction force while the cable is dragged and veering under load, F = 240 kN Cable carried on this anchor = 12 shackles = 330 m
Estimate whether the cable can absorb the ship's remaining way, and what that means for the master's next decision
The ship's kinetic energy is what the cable has to absorb before way is checked.
First convert displacement to an effective mass using the working assumption above.
Kinetic energy at the moment the cable comes taut:
The cable removes this energy as friction over the distance it is dragged along the bottom.
At the estimated drag force, the length of cable that must be veered and dragged to absorb all 96 MJ is:
Compare with what is carried.
400 m is more cable than the 330 m on this anchor, so the full 96 MJ of way cannot be absorbed before the cable reaches the bitter end.
Answer≈400 m of dragged cable is needed to absorb the ship's way at 2 m/s, against 330 m carried — the anchor checks and sheers the ship, it does not stop it outright; the master must still plan on the remaining sea room, not on the cable alone.
The trap: treating this as a pass/fail check on whether the anchor 'works'. The correct reading is that the anchor buys a partial, valuable reduction in way and time to manoeuvre — the master's remaining options (second anchor, tug, choosing where to take the ground if it comes to that) still have to be worked on that basis.
A containership (LBP close to the length of the swell now running) has a natural roll period of 16 s, established from her stability data. She is steaming into a long swell of 12 s period, heading close to the swell direction (a head sea), at 9.36 m/s (≈18.2 kn). The officer of the watch suspects parametric rolling and wants to know how close the ship is to the resonance condition, and what change of speed would move her clear of it.
Ship's natural roll period, T_roll = 16 s Swell period, T_w = 12 s Deep-water wave celerity approximation, C ≈ 1.56 × T_w (m/s, T_w in seconds) Ship's speed into the swell, V = 9.36 m/s Parametric-rolling resonance condition: encounter period T_e ≈ ½ T_roll
First estimate the celerity (speed of advance) of the swell using the standard deep-water approximation.
Encounter period, head sea:
meeting the swell shortens the period between successive crests passing the ship, compared with the swell's own period.
Compare against the resonance threshold.
Half the ship's natural roll period.
T_e matches ½T_roll exactly, and the swell length is close to the ship's own length.
Both conditions for parametric rolling are satisfied. This is a high-risk combination of speed and heading, not a steering problem.
Test whether easing to roughly half speed clears the resonance window.
9.6 s is clear of the 8.0 s resonance window.
So slowing (or opening the encounter angle with a course change) breaks the coincidence; which of the two is used depends on which the passage plan can better afford.
AnswerAt 18.2 kn the encounter period is exactly 8.0 s, matching the resonance condition (½ × 16 s roll period) — high parametric-rolling risk. Reducing to about 9 kn opens T_e to 9.6 s, clear of resonance.
The trap: assuming any small alteration of course or speed is automatically safe. While the swell length stays close to the ship's own length, only a change large enough to shift T_e meaningfully away from ½T_roll actually breaks the coincidence — recompute the new T_e, don't just assume it moved far enough.
A ship of 180 m LBP is to go alongside with no tugs available. As she makes her final approach, nearly stopped in the water, the wind is blowing at 12 m/s (≈23 kn) directly onto the berth, beam-on. The bow thruster is rated at 150 kN. Determine whether the bow thruster alone can hold the ship off the excessive set caused by the wind, by comparing moments about the ship's centre of lateral resistance rather than comparing forces directly.
Beam wind speed, V = 12 m/s Air density, ρ = 1.2 kg/m³ Assumed drag coefficient, C_d = 1.0 Above-water lateral (windage) area, A = 1,500 m² Lever arm, wind-pressure centroid to centre of lateral resistance, ℓ_w = 90 m Bow thruster rated thrust = 150 kN Lever arm, thruster to centre of lateral resistance, ℓ_t = 70 m
Determine whether the bow thruster alone can hold the ship off the excessive set caused by the wind, by comparing moments about the ship's centre of lateral resistance rather than comparing forces directly
Wind force on the beam:
use the standard drag relationship for a flat lateral area exposed to the wind.
This force does not act at the ship's centre of lateral resistance.
So what actually sets the ship off the berth is the moment it creates about that point, not the force on its own.
The thruster's counter-moment about the same point.
Using its own, shorter, lever arm to the centre of lateral resistance:
Compare the two moments.
M_wind exceeds M_thruster, so the thruster cannot hold the bow off against this wind, even though its rated thrust (150 kN) is greater than the wind force itself (129.6 kN).
AnswerM_wind ≈ 11,664 kN·m exceeds the thruster's 10,500 kN·m — the bow thruster alone cannot hold this ship off the berth in this wind. Either wait for it to ease or bring in a tug; going alongside as planned risks a hard contact with the berth.
The trap: comparing the wind force (129.6 kN) directly with the thruster's rated thrust (150 kN) and concluding the thruster wins. A modest force acting on a long lever arm can out-turn a stronger force acting close to the pivot — always compare moments, not raw numbers of kN.
KE method (anchor as brake)d = ½mv² ÷ F — cable length needed to absorb the ship's way; expect to lose gear, not stop deadLoss of propulsionInform VTS, steer on remaining way, anchors ready, tugs called, warn traffic — engineers diagnose in parallelParametric rollλ ≈ L, encounter period ≈ ½ roll period — change speed or heading, not helm aloneSynchronous rollEncounter period ≈ full roll period — same cure: alter course/speed to break the coincidenceBroachingFollowing/quartering seas, low encounter frequency, surf-riding, rudder loses bite as the stern liftsWave celerity (deep water)C ≈ 1.56 × T (m/s, T in seconds) — quick estimate of a swell's speed of advancePivot point≈ L/3 from the bow going ahead; moves aft toward the stern going asternWind force / momentF = ½ρC_dAV²; compare moments (force × lever arm) about the centre of lateral resistance, not raw forcesInteraction and bank effectGrows with speed, falls with under-keel and lateral clearanceTug girtingBeam-on tow capsize risk; gob rope rigged and quick-release kept clear